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This article investigates the notion of “conservative democracy” in the
discourse of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in relation
to the concepts of change and continuity. It argues that “conservative democracy,” which is
presented as a “genuine contribution” of the AKP to Turkish politics, is actually a continua-
tion of a tradition within Turkish conservative literature rather than a product of the moment.
Hence, contrary to the party’s claim, “conservative democracy” is not an invented but a
reinterpreted concept. It is reformulated pragmatically to illustrate a rupture from the




Turkish politics entered a new phase with the November 2002 general elections.
The novel feature of the election results was the landslide victory of the Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which is a splinter of the
Islamic-oriented Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) previously attached to the
National Outlook (Milli Görü
 




 Strikingly, in the July 2007
general elections the ruling AKP increased its vote-share from 34.3 percent to 46.6
percent for a second term of single-party AKP government, despite the existence of
sharp divisions among the public and increasing secularist opposition.
Since coming to power, discussions on the AKP and its leading cadre have
revolved around whether or not the party has changed. The Islamist record of the
party’s prominent figures has somehow restrained them and confined the discussion
to the limits of Islamist reactionism. What is missing at this point is an awareness of
the historical contingency and continuity that could contribute to the understanding
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The cadres of the AKP are seen as “closet Islamists,” and the party’s loyalty to
the founding principles of the Turkish Republic, particularly secularism, is
questioned by the secularist portions of society. Hence, the leaders of the party have
felt obliged to demonstrate that the party is not a version of Islamist-oriented parties
arising from the MG movement. To this end, the leaders of the AKP came up with
the concept of “conservative democracy” to define the identity of the party, which is
portrayed as a “unique” and “novel” phenomenon in Turkish politics. However, the
concepts and arguments used by the AKP in generating “conservative democracy”
are the continuation of already existing formulations and discussions within Turkish
conservative literature. The objective of this article, thus, is to reveal in what ways
the AKP’s “conservative democracy” maintains the terminology and discourse




 and differs from
the arguments of the Islamic conservatism of the MG movement.
First, the article elaborates on the emergence of the AKP in Turkish politics. The
context in which the party leaders formulated the principles of the party will be
examined. The second part looks at the relationship between Western conservatism
and the AKP and analyzes why the AKP came up with the concept of “conservative
democracy.” The third part decomposes the notion of “conservative democracy.”
The AKP’s approach to “conservative democracy” is analyzed with references to
and comparisons with a number of concerns with which the synthesis-oriented
conservative thinkers dealt. Most of the AKP members were once affiliated with
MG, and thus what the MG ideologues argued will also be examined.
 
The Emergence of the AKP
 
From the 1990s the anti-secular activities of the Islamist groups and, as their
political projection, the radical policies of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP)
fuelled the fears of regime change in Turkey. In the 1995 general elections the RP
won the most seats in parliament, a development that shocked the secular elites. It
was the first time that an Islamic-oriented party had become the largest partner in a
coalition government in Turkey. The words, actions, and policies of the RP




 The antagonistic atmosphere did not end up in a
direct military takeover but in the resignation of the then Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan and later the removal of the RP from the political scene by decision of the




 not only brought the
collapse of the coalition government but also had a transformative impact on
the Islamist groups to make them realize that radical Islam would find no place in




 Many of the Islamists chose to be modernist rather
than clinging to the past.
The FP, which was established following the closure of the RP, split as a conse-
quence of the dissenting voices mounted among the party ranks. After it too was
closed down by the Constitutional Court due to its actions against the principles of




) joined the Felicity Party
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Virtuous” (Erdemliler Hareketi), which then formed the core cadre of the AKP. The




an, became the leader of the latter
movement. However, having been convicted previously for “openly inciting the
public to hatred on the basis of religion” in accordance with Article 312 of the




an came to grips with cleaning up his somewhat
tarnished image. Drawing lessons from such bitter experiences, he chose to take a
more moderate line.





an’s intention was to reach a broader electorate. Some scholars have argued in
their research on the AKP that he was indeed successful. Based on the analysis of
the voter base of the AKP, Özbudun argues that the AKP is not a successor of any
political party and it “appears to have successfully rebuilt the Özal ANAP
[Motherland Party] coalition, bringing together former centre-right voters, moderate





 Some other experts of Turkish politics evaluate these developments as a
transformation of a religiously oriented party to a moderate, conservative, demo-




 Similarly, Heper refers to the





describes it as a “unifying centrist party” that puts forward “the most liberal political








an frequently highlights that the AKP is not a successor of the MG parties
and that there is no need to feel threatened by its cadre, particularly concerning




 The party is stated to be
ready to transmit various demands and sensitivities to the political sphere and it




 After the AKP’s election
victory in 2002, Erdo
 
[GBREV] an introduced the party’s new political outlook as “conserva-
tive democracy” with which new horizons in the political life of Turkey claim to be
opened up. That effort was timely and pragmatic. It enabled the party to give the
message to the secularists that the party had severed its relations with Islamist
discourse. To strengthen their hands, the founders of the party particularly underline





chief advisor and the mastermind of the AKP’s foreign policy, explains the rationale
behind it by saying that “Islam should not be reduced to a political group or party
because then it will end up with certain parties monopolizing the representation of
Islam.” Instead of defining themselves as an Islamic party, he noted, the leaders of





 Thus, they reject the label “Muslim-democrat” and instead prefer
“conservative democrat” as their new identity.
 
Conservative Democracy: A New Concept?
 
It has been passionately argued by the leading cadre of the AKP that “conservative
democracy” is a “new political philosophy and style” that never existed before in
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 And the fundamentals
of Western conservatism are presented as the basic parameters of the AKP’s political
identity by the party leaders. To contextualize the argument, the historical develop-
ment of conservatism(s) in the West, the philosophical foundations of it, and the major
issues it tackles must be addressed.
 
Western Conservatism and the AKP
 
The conceptual and philosophical foundations of conservatism in Europe were





tism emerged as a reaction against the ideas of Enlightenment and the French
Revolution in continental Europe. It was laid on anti-rationalist foundations. As part
of this trajectory the French type of conservatism developed a more radical and
reactionary way with a special emphasis on “religion,” whereas in the German case,
with its strong metaphysical and philosophical foundations, “history” was at the
forefront. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon experience originated by following a
different path. With the rise of industrial capitalism after the Industrial Revolution,
sweeping changes in the dynamics of society occurred. This resulted in the develop-
ment of a new approach, which focused on the necessity of making reforms without
weakening loyalty to traditional authorities, to the newly emerging problems. The
Anglo-Saxon variant of conservatism had an evolutionary and defensive character.
The defining concept for this version was “tradition.”
The meaning of conservatism has changed through the centuries from having a
negative connotation as being considered an anti-modern move to a more positive




 as the “idealism





 and as “a movement acting within a dynamic society in need of




 Hence, it is difficult to define a singular
notion of conservatism that transcends time, place, and circumstance; every society
develops its own conservative understanding. Nonetheless, there are common
themes and ideas which all conservatives embrace.
Conservatives start with the assumption that the human being is irrational and
imperfect. The individual is not taken independently but as a communal entity.
Society, on the other hand, is regarded as a “living organism” and a natural whole
that is independent from all the elements of which it is composed. It shapes the iden-
tities of the individuals. Maintaining and preserving order is considered crucial for
social life. However, this cannot be achieved with individual liberties but with the
existence of an authority. The other base of societal order, for conservatives, is
private property, which is also seen as vital for securing freedom and keeping
tradition alive. In conservative thinking, authority, freedom, and order are three
interconnected concepts. Ensuring the continuity of tradition is the key issue. There-
fore, historically accumulated wisdom of community and social institutions as its
products are given special emphasis. Family as the basis of the society is seen as
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considered to have important functions for stability and order by creating a bond of
unity in society.
Conservatives have a lasting respect for tradition and veneration for the past. That
is why the connection between the past and the present is emphasized. Generally but
misleadingly, conservatism is associated with preserving the status quo and hence
being against change. However, it is radical and drastic change that conservatives
oppose. The concepts of “reform” and “restoration” are cherished in conservative
thinking, which addresses itself to sensitivity towards the preservation of essence




What is important for the purpose of the present article is that the AKP claims to
be in tune with Western conservatism. In defining its identity, many themes
mentioned above are cited and used as proof of its being located within the Western
conservative tradition. For example, the AKP emphasized social order and
prioritized justice for establishing order. It is asserted that politics are seen as an
instrument for serving the interests of society. Family and religion are also under-
lined frequently. Family is described as the essential social institution, referring to
its role in building a bridge between past and future and preserving traditional
values. Religion is seen as a cohesive and unifying force. The emphasis on continu-
ity is also remarkable in the AKP’s discourse. Therefore, like Western conservatism,
it highlights tradition, history, and experience. For the AKP, history and culture are
the sources of energy and inspiration. Experience is regarded as one of the principal
references of the party’s understanding of political administration. A radical and
abrupt change enforced from above is firmly rejected, and instead gradual and
evolutionary change is favored as an essential component of conservative
democratic identity.
Indeed, the AKP has drawn parallels with Western conservative thinking in refer-
ring to similar themes. However, this is not sufficient to claim that the “conservative
democracy” of the AKP is attributed to Western conservatism, which is inaccurately




 What is paradoxical here is
that although Akdo
 
[GBREV] an is of the opinion that “conservatism emerged in diverse
cultural forms throughout the world, its articulation and implementation have been




 he persists using the term “universal.” Certainly,
Turkey has its own unique conception(s) of conservatism. If the “conservative
democracy” of the party ideologues was embedded into the conservative literature
in Turkey rather than the Western tradition, this would actually serve to strengthen
the party’s hands by showing that “conservative democracy” is not an imported
concept but a native one. Therefore, this article aims to reveal the historical roots of
“conservative democracy” within the Turkish context. Before doing so, it is useful




From its inception, the AKP has been given different labels depending on how it is
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 are other tags attached to the party. There are even some political
analysts, especially American neoconservatives, who question the AKP’s self-




In that context, the AKP’s best endeavor to remove all those labels and to
formulate a self-defining concept instead seems entirely understandable. Since
conservatism is a loaded political term generally associated with religious reaction-
ism in Turkey, the founders of the AKP have preferred not to define the party solely
as conservative. In that sense, their efforts are remarkably similar to the early repub-
lican synthesis-oriented conservatives’ struggle to differentiate conservatism from
other political tendencies. Early republican conservatives were worried about the
fuzziness of conservatism as a concept and its potential misinterpretation by
the founders of the republican regime. Hence they used the term conservative with




 Conservatism that is preceded by an adjective
provided them with a shield to make a veiled opposition and prevented them from
being perceived as the foes of the republic. Due to the similar concerns and motiva-
tions, the AKP rediscovered the way to use conservatism with an addition, which,




 concept of contemporary politics, and thus “conser-
vative democracy” as the new identity of the party was born.
 




“Conservative democracy” is defined as a change-centered concept by AKP leaders.
Since “change” has generally been understood in relation to the dynamics of
Westernization and modernization in Turkey, “conservative democracy” is thus
pertinent to these concepts. Therefore, to better analyze the AKP’s understanding of
“conservative democracy,” the continuities and changes regarding issues of the
West, Westernization, and modernization, especially in conservative and Islamist
lines of thinking, should be examined.
The issue of Westernization, starting from the Tanzimat (Reordering) period
(1839–1876), has been controversial for Turkish intellectuals. The mentality of
Tanzimat can be summarized as “being devoted to the East in relation to faith but




 In the aftermath of
World War I, it started to be widely criticized by a group of young intellectuals who









 and were very much influenced by the victory over the Allied
Forces in the Turkish War for Independence (1918–1923). The thesis of the group
was that though the Turks had nothing material, they were victorious with only the
power of their spirit over the West, which was empowered by technology and
science. It was merely an uphill struggle to free the Turkish people from the feeling
of inferiority that had been perpetuated since the Tanzimat era. At that point, those
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In the first decades of the republic, the distinction between culture and civiliza-




 was influential. The Islamists of that
era believed that technological and scientific achievements could and in fact should
be adopted without leading to any significant changes in other spheres. However,
the early republican synthesis-oriented conservatives argued that it was impossible
to take only technology from the West. As familiarity with the sources of Western
civilization increased, lifestyles were also modified. For these Islamists, Western-
ization was not a degenerating development but rather a renovation and refreshing
process. As such, these conservatives had no direct problems with the new regime’s
modernization project or with Westernization. That said, they resisted the total erad-
ication of relations with the past that would alienate the masses from the moderniza-




the synthesis-oriented conservatives did warn the republican elites, albeit
courteously, not to become extremists in making abrupt changes.
Beside this conservative stream that continued to flow without becoming a
political ideology, Islamism was revived in the 1970s. The MG leaders, who
synchronized themselves with Islamist discourse on the West and Westernization,
argued that it was possible to adopt only science and technology from the West, and










discourse. His speech in a meeting organized by the Ministry of Education in
January 2008 about a project to send students abroad for post-graduate education









stated that “we [as Turks] have not adopted scientific and artistic advancements of





 Even though Erdo
 
[GBREV] an and his close associates frequently high-
light that they no longer have any organic links with the MG movement and its
ideals, it is possible to draw a parallel between Erdo
 
[GBREV] an’s arguments and Erbakan’s
ideas on Westernization. Nevertheless, the differences are still substantial.
First of all, Erbakan built his discourse on a harsh criticism of the West. In his line
of thinking, the West is a monolithic entity which is anti-Islam, pro-Zionist, and


















Under the influence of Erbakanism the current leading political figures of the
AKP—then of the RP—criticized the West for being “misguided,” “degenerated,”




 due to its moral deprivation. This anti-Western rhetoric
started to wane gradually after the establishment of the FP. However, the culminat-
ing point of change has become the establishment of the AKP. Europe is now
defined by the leaders of the AKP as “the vanguard of the most outstanding human
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the superiority of European (Western) countries in terms of democracy, secular
institutions, technological advancement, and living standards is taken for granted.
Similar to the early Republican conservatives, the notables of the AKP are
opponents neither of the West nor of Westernization.





 Although those conservative intellectuals were longing for




Their paths in that sense diverge from Islamist thinking. Beyatlı stated the necessity
of a “mentality shift” joining Western civilization. For him, being part of it without
losing one’s own identity could only be realized by “coming back to the homeland




), which means benefiting from the









an said in his January 2008 address mentioned above draws






[GBREV] an attaches importance to good education
for progress toward modernization and development. Besides, he strenuously
advises students to return to Turkey after completing studies abroad.
The leaders of the AKP are also inspired by the synthesis-oriented conserva-
tives’ idea of the presence of “two Europes.” The “defunct West,” which valued
the hegemony of science and positivism, was criticized as being opposed to the




 Similarly, for the
leaders of the AKP, Europe is not homogeneous and monolithic. As the former
minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah Gül, stated, different circles in Europe act
with different reflexes. Among those, some actions justify labeling the EU as a





pointed at the existence of “two Europes” and confusion in Europe about its role
and identity. Just as the idea of “two Europes” was instrumental for the early
Republican conservatives so that they could release themselves, on the one hand,
from the phobia of Westernization and, on the other, being labeled as the oppo-
nents of the newly established Republican regime, the idea of a heterogeneous
Europe releases the AKP from being entrapped in an anti-EU stance and eliminates
the risk of deviating from the reform process.
It is undeniable that as members of the RP many prominent figures of the AKP
previously had a different orientation toward EU membership. They accused
Turkish politicians who applied for European Community (EC) membership of
betraying Turkish history, culture, and—most significantly—national indepen-
dence.45 Erbakan, as their mentor, interpreted that attempt as a denial of the Muslim
identity to become European.46 Nevertheless, such examples of oscillations between
past arguments and current opinions of AKP leaders are not sufficient to claim that
the anti-European rhetoric of the MG tradition still lingers in the discourse of the
AKP. Indeed, the leaders of the AKP have tried hard to build the party on a different
orientation. The founders of the party have given importance to being identified
with the Turkish center-right party tradition on supporting Turkey’s European
vocation. Importantly, it was the AKP government that managed to begin accession
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Cultural differences, especially religious issues, were mostly highlighted in the
discourse of the MG parties on EU membership.47 The AKP has also placed empha-
sis on cultural differences basically derived from Islamic identity, but now it
presents this difference as an advantage for Turkey’s bid for EU membership, as it
would contribute to the cultural enrichment of the EU.48 The leaders of the party
prefer to highlight the advancement of the West in absorbing and implementing
values such as democracy, human rights, and pluralism. In that way, they have
instrumentally transformed the concepts previously framed by the MG tradition to
oppose Turkey’s integration with the EU to advance Turkey’s progress in meeting
the accession criteria. Moreover, building a similar terminology with the synthesis-
oriented conservatism, the AKP’s “mission” is defined as “to prove that a Muslim
society is capable of changing and renovating itself, attaining contemporary
standards, while preserving its values, traditions, and identity.”49 This self-
identification serves the party, on one hand, in legitimizing itself inside the country
and, on the other, in receiving support and escaping from skepticism in the interna-
tional arena. Indeed, as Da[GBREV] ı argues, “the search for systemic legitimacy and secu-
rity” influenced the AKP’s political discourse on human rights, the rule of law, and
democracy, and this has offered the AKP “a discursive supremacy and legitimacy”
in the Turkish political arena.50
Apart from all these similarities, conservatives’ discussion on the culture–
civilization dichotomy, especially the impact of a shift in civilization on culture, has
not been observed in the AKP’s discourse. Despite focusing on the institutional and
policy changes that would accompany EU membership, no attempt has been made
to develop ideas on how to cope with the problems that will occur with the transfor-
mation that will take place at societal and cultural levels. In fact, this would
normally matter to a conservative party.
Democracy, Religion, and Secularism
From the very beginning there has been strong suspicion regarding the AKP’s real
agenda, especially on the secular and democratic character of the state. Although
Erdo[GBREV] an has adopted a cautious discourse that avoids terms open to misinterpreta-
tions, the secular elite has never forgotten his previous words and deeds.51 To dispel
those fears Erdo[GBREV] an admits his faults and explains his past mentality with reference
to the particular circumstances of those days. Nonetheless, most secularists remain
unimpressed by such explanations. The fear of regime change, in due course,
yielded to a fear of gradual Islamization of social life that has haunted the secularist
bloc. Some relatively new policies of the AKP are interpreted as the signs of a rever-
sion to Islamism, such as imposing restrictions on the sale of alcohol and tripling its
consumption tax, attempting to criminalize adultery, and formulating a proposal to
allow girls wearing headscarves in universities.
Erdo[GBREV] an frequently underlines that he has departed decisively from his earlier
aggressive discourse. Previously, democracy was defined by Erdo[GBREV] an as “a means
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does not define democracy as a “means” any longer but as “the perfect arrangement
invented by humankind.”53 The AKP’s conceptualization of democracy, in fact,
consists of collective reasoning and consultation, that is, the large-scale exchange of
ideas. Different opinions are considered worthy of respect. The AKP, similar to the
synthesis-oriented conservatives, puts emphasis on the importance of tolerating
opposing views. For the AKP, this tolerance is essential for democracy to flourish,
whereas the conservatives consider it important to become civilized. The basic
principle of a civilization, according to the latter, is showing respect to all kinds of
beliefs, without which democracy would deteriorate.54
Parallel to the understanding of democracy in liberal democracies, the AKP
praises the notion of freedom. “The assurance of democratization by placing the
individual at the center of all its policies and protecting fundamental rights and
liberties” are said to be the most important tasks of the party.55 Among basic rights
and freedoms, freedom of religion and freedom of conscience is given particular
emphasis.56
There are obvious continuities between the views of the AKP and of synthesis-
oriented conservatives on the role of religion in public and political life. Religion
as the source of morality has a place both in the discourse of the AKP leaders and
of the conservatives. As Heper and Tokta[SCEDIL]  argue, moral development is found
behind Erdo[GBREV] an’s statements, which were considered by the majority of secularists
as signs of hankering for political Islam.57 The conservatives highlighted the close
relationship between religion and morality as well. Religion was considered to be
one of the vital factors that enrich and deepen moral life,58 and morality was
defined as the prerequisite of social existence.59 Likewise, in the AKP party
program it says that religion is considered “as one of the most important institu-
tions of humanity.”60 The notables of the AKP feel the necessity to underline that
there is a big difference between a party that attributes importance to religion and a
party that transforms religion into an ideology. They emphasize that the AKP is
neither a party based on religion nor a party using religion for political purposes.61
As Erdo[GBREV] an noted, “the AKP attributed importance to religion as a social value.”
This had been verbalized earlier in the works of synthesis-oriented conservatives.
Religion was either described as a “social reality,”62 which was “both the creator of
the pure spirit of our [Turkish] nation and the real mirror of it”63 or as the “seed of
culture.”64
Another important evolution concerns the AKP’s conceptualization of secular-
ism. The innovation here is not seeing secularism only as the “assurance of democ-
racy” or as a “guarantor of the freedom of religion and conscience of members of
varied religions” but also as an assurance for the freedom of those without religious
beliefs to organize their lives in the way they want.65 Secularism restricts the state,
not the individual, and, as such, is seen as a prerequisite for democracy. Secularism
in the party program is defined as the impartiality of the state toward any kind of
religious and philosophical belief. The preservation of the rights and freedoms of
believers and nonbelievers is seen as an important tenet of secularism—a principle
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Similarly, secularism was emphasized by the early republican conservatives as
much as religion and morality. By stating that “[s]cience relies on reason; religion
on faith, and hence their realms are separate and compatible,” the sphere of religion
was separated from others.66 That the other condition of secularism is freeing
religion from intervention in its own sphere was also underlined. The AKP’s under-
standing of secularism, which underlines the impartiality of the state towards any
religious belief, is identical with the views of early Republican conservatives. The
state should not exercise influence over religion67 and has no right to forbid
religious practices or to show hostility toward religious people according to the
synthesis-oriented conservatives.68
The conservative intellectuals became influential to a certain extent in freeing
people from the idea that Islam is inherently reactionary. They stressed the power of
Islam as “a collection of moral principles” in unifying people and thus strengthening
national unity. Similar views are highlighted by the AKP to distance itself from
being portrayed as reactionary and a threat to the secular character of the state
domestically. The AKP prevented radicalization of some sections of society that
hold themselves at a distance from the regime. It played a moderating role and
contributed to their integration into—as opposed to alienation from—the system.
Change and Continuity
As mentioned above, the AKP has adopted a political language that is inspired from
a moderate and change-oriented conservative tradition. Without explicitly referring
to the synthesis-oriented conservative literature, the AKP’s objective is defined as to
continue the “old” (everlasting and perpetual), established, traditional, and sacred
under modern circumstances.69 In the party discourse, oppressive projects of change
and social engineering are disapproved of because “change,” for them, should be
gradual, natural, and based on the natural transformation of society.70
The inevitability of change was prominent in the thinking of the early republi-
can conservatives too. However, what made their approach original was their
endeavor to bring together change and continuity. It was molded in the mottos of
“change within continuity,” (imtidad içinde de[GBREV] i[SCEDIL] me)71 and “continuing by chang-
ing, changing by continuing” (devam ederek de[GBREV] i[SCEDIL] mek, de[GBREV] i[SCEDIL] erek devam etmek).72
The former denoted the persistence of the past while changing and renewing itself,
and the latter highlighted preserving the essence while evolving. It was asserted
that change should freely find its own route without being manipulated from
above.73
Following a similar line of thinking as conservative intellectuals’ regarding
“change” and “continuity,” the AKP ideologues have included these two concepts in
the discourse of the party. It is emphasized that the AKP’s insistence on preservation
should be differentiated from opposing change and progress. According to party
notables, it refers to adapting to change without losing one’s own essence.74 Clearly,
the AKP ideologues resemble the conservative intellectuals in characterizing
“change” as an evolutionary rather than revolutionary concept with a commitment to
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preserving the essence of culture but with an emphasis on Islam as the foremost
element of it.
The Search for a Synthesis
“Conservative democracy” is depicted by AKP ideologues as a formulation of
synthesis that aims at creating a harmonious fusion between “conservatism” and
“democracy.” The ingredients of the synthesis are seemingly contradictory
concepts such as regional and universal, traditional and modern, change and
continuity. The AKP expects that this synthesis will help to reformulate the
relations between religion and democracy, tradition and modernity, and state and
society.75 Additionally, their “conservative democracy” synthesis will prove that
adapting to change without renouncing its own essence is not an anomaly. In the
words of Gül, the challenge is to prove that tradition and moral values can be in
perfect harmony with modern standards of life, and in turn this will contribute to
the modern world.76
The search for synthesis is not a novel phenomenon in Turkish political thought.
The specific genre of early republican conservatism examined in this article particu-
larly put emphasis on it. Accordingly, history and geography give Turkey a
“mission to create the synthesis” because the Turkish nation is “charged with
finding the equilibrium of combination” (terkibin muvazenesini bulma[GBREV] a memur
edilmi[SCEDIL] ).77 One of the well-known formulations was the “East–West synthesis.”
This can be defined roughly as “attaching one’s heart to the East and mind to the
West; believing like an Easterner while thinking like a Westerner.”78 Nonetheless,
the synthesis is neither about transferring the past en masse to the present time nor
about a total amalgamation of the Eastern mentality into the Western. There was a
consensus on the idea that the notion of synthesis implied more than providing a
peaceful coexistence between two different things, and the byproduct should be
unique and authentic.79
In a similar vein, the AKP strongly emphasized that Turkey is a bridge between
East and West, Europe and Asia, Islam and Christianity. By channeling the two
civilizations, Turkey’s “mission” is described by the AKP leaders as contributing to
dialogue, cooperation, and peace in the world.80 For the party notables, Turkey’s
“multi-faceted geography” and its experience of combining a secular democratic
structure with traditions deriving from an Islamic culture are “vital assets.”81
Evidently, the AKP reaches a common ground with the synthesis-oriented conserva-
tives by assigning such a mission to Turkey through leaning on historical and
geographical features.
It should be noted that seeking an original synthesis for the early republican
conservatives was an antidote to averting the social crisis of the Turkish people in
the face of civilization change. The instrumentality of their synthesis formulations is
a fact. Those attempts provided an appropriate and safe environment to the conser-
vative intellectuals for presenting their suggestions and criticisms without becoming
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formulation of the AKP, becomes instrumental in escaping from being labeled as
reactionary or as a staunch defender of the status quo.
Conclusion
The rapid transformation and rise of the AKP has sparked an intense debate in
Turkey concerning the nature of change in its identity. Secular elites, who think that
its transformation is cosmetic and part of a tactic, accuse the leaders of the AKP of
hiding their real intentions. Against the constant criticisms of the secularists, the
ideologues of the AKP put forward the concept of “conservative democracy” out of
a necessity to differentiate the unifying, harmonizing, and balancing line of the party
from the religiously oriented political parties.82
That the very concept of “conservative democracy” did not exist before is true.
However, the themes used in the conceptualization of the term have long been part
of Turkish conservative thought. As part of this archaeological attempt, the ideo-
logues of the party borrowed some of the ideas of the early republican synthesis-
oriented conservatives, such as the inevitability of change, searching for a synthesis,
the unifying potential of religion, and the necessity to modernize the nation in
accordance with the norms and values of the West. In order to moderate the
influences of excessive Westernization in their struggle of survival, the intellectuals
of the early republican period used “conservatism” as a means to avoid being
labeled as reactionaries in the eyes of the Republican elites. The AKP has followed
the same strategy to avoid being perceived as anti-regime.
“Conservative democracy” as the leitmotiv of the party reflects the familiar
vocabulary of the synthesis-oriented conservatives. Nevertheless, it is never overtly
pronounced by the party leaders. Rather, it is mispresented as being built on a
Western practice of conservatism. Only in Akdo[GBREV] an’s book, which can be regarded
as the AKP’s manifesto on “conservative democracy,” early Republican conserva-
tives like Baltacıo[GBREV] lu, Beyatlı, Tanpınar, Tunç, and Safa are cited by name. This can
be interpreted as a proof of influence. However, citing the names without giving an
in-depth analysis of their opinions and arguments regarding issues similar to those
that the AKP recently vocalized is quite interesting. Therefore, this article argues
that “conservative democracy” is not an invented but a reinterpreted concept in
Turkish politics. Interestingly, in one of his speeches, Erdo[GBREV] an admitted that the aim
of the party is to “reformulate” the Turkish value system according to a conservative
political approach with universal characteristics.83 However, he does not clarify the
input of the reformulation.
“Conservative democracy” as a term has an immense inner strength. It shows
considerable potential for opening new horizons in Turkish politics. It could make
the idea of synthesis, which has long been an issue of cultural conservatism, visible
and influential in the political arena. In fact “conservative democracy” is deeply
rooted in the history of Turkish conservative thought and thus the true heir of the
large accumulation of philosophic discussion and extensive literature. If the AKP
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in Turkey, its becoming a nebulous concept would be eliminated. Otherwise, the
potential of the term cannot be fulfilled. The concept of “conservative democracy”
has been (re)produced out of pragmatic concerns, and the continuity with the
synthesis-oriented conservatism suffers neglect. Consequently, up until now the
ideologues of the AKP have fallen short in concretizing “conservative democracy,”
and hence its potential is exploited. The strength of the term, ironically, turns out to
be a serious weakness.
Although this is the case, the AKP manages to benefit. The term is instrumental,
on one hand, in indicating a break with the Islamist background of the party leaders,
and on the other, by providing continuity with the synthesis-oriented Turkish
conservatism in portraying the AKP as a party of the center. With the conservative
component, the leaders of the party send the message to supporters of the AKP that
they are still fond of preserving moral and cultural values. The other component,
democracy, helps to renovate their image outside Turkey, especially in the West.
An appropriate synthesis between democracy and conservatism might ease the
adaptation process of democratic reforms and transformations without losing
sensitivity towards essential cultural and societal elements as long as the party
leaders continue to be sincere about considering democracy as the foremost
component of the term “conservative democracy.” However, this is the issue where
“conservative democracy” falls short. Regarding which of the two, conservatism or
democracy, is given primary concern by the AKP is not clear. The deviation of the
party from the discourse as in the attempts to criminalize adultery and the policies
to ban alcohol in AKP-run municipality restaurants arouses suspicions that the
party favors the state’s interference in the private sphere as a moral obligation to
society. This leads to the interpretation that democracy is not considered as the
main pillar of its “conservative democratic” identity. Whether the “conservative
democracy” of the AKP is aiming at a “conservative transformation centered
around democracy” or at a “reconstruction of conservatism in a democratic format”
is an open question now. Without clarifying which component of the term is
considered to be the main pillar of the political discourse of the party, the advan-
tages of “conservative democracy” as a term might in the future become liabilities
for the party.
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ş
ğ
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